MARTIAL LAW AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE SOLDIER'S LIABILITY TO THE CIVILIAN.
The numerous occasions in recent years on which the civil
laws have been superseded by military rule in time of grave
public disorder and calamity have given rise to considerable discussion of martial law under the constitutional governnients of
the United States and'England.1 From the middle of the seventeenth century until the beginning of the twentieth, .martiallaw
had very rarely been. put in force in England or in the United
States, except in time of public war. As a result, there was
little precedent to guide the courts in attempting to adjust disputes
Martial law is here used in the restricted sense in which it is generally

used in the opinions. It does not include the law which governs, the conduct
of opposing armies towards each other, which forms, really, a part of international law. Nor does it include military law. which is the disciplinary
and governmental code of the army itself, with jurisdiction only over soldiers,
and spies who directly interfere with the working of the army. Nor does
martial law include what is usually called military government-the authority
exercised by military commanders over occupied territory of an enemy country. It includes merely the exercise of authority by military forces over
civilians in domestic territory outside the zone of actual conflict, or when there
is no conflict of such character as to constitute a civil or foreign war, at times
when the civil authorities have proved too weak t6 maintain their control in
the district. This is the sense in which it is used by Chief Justice Chase in
referring to the powers of the National Government in his famous exposition
in the dissenting opinion in the case of Ex parte Milligan, (U. S., x866) 4
Wall. 2, 141: "There are under the Constitution three kinds of military junsdict:on: one to he exercised both in peace and war; another to be exercised
in time of foreign war outside the boundaries of the United States, or in time
of rebellion and civil war. within states or districts occupied by rebels treated
as belligerents: and a third, to be exercised in time of invasion or insurrection
within the United States. or during rebellion within the limits of the states
maintaining adhesion to the National Government. when the public danger requires its exercise. The first of these may be called jurisdiction under Military Law and is found in the Acts of Congress prescribing rules and articles
of war. or otherwise providing for the government of the national forces;
the second may be called MIilitary Government, superseding, as far as may be
deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the military commander
under the direction of the President. with the express or implied sanction of
Congress; while the third may be denominated Martial Law Proper, and is
called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress
cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the
President, in times of insurrection or invasion or of civil or foreign war, in
districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures public
safety and private rights."
Martial law in this sense does not exist when the soldiers act in subordination to the civil authorities, doing nothing which the civil authorities themselves could not do under the police power. It exists only when the military
supplants the civil power and transcends the constitutional limitations, with
respect to the invasion of life, liberty and property, placed upon the civil
power.
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arising out of the ever-increasing suspensions of civil authority.
Whether martial law could exist at all in the United States was
a debatable question at the beginning of the present century.
And if it be admitted to exist the courts are still in a quandry as
to what effect its existence has upon the rights and privileges
of citizens. Pressed upon one side by the constitutional guarantees and upon the other by the overwhelming necessities of
the moment, the courts have generally decided as expediency
dictated. Sometimes they have fratikly avowed that the decision rested upon expediency. 2 More often they have attempted
to justify their decision upon logical grounds. It is but natural
to expect that the principles evolved in such cases, under such
circumstances, would not form a very logical system. In a recent lecture on the subject Lord Sumner, who sat as Lord of
Appeal in Ordinary during the period of the war and thereafter,
said that there were three difficulties id dealing with this subject:
it was lacking in precision, it abounded in paradoxes and it ran
very close to politics. 3 This substantially amounts to a statement that there is no systematic body of law on this subject at
all. And this is the learned Lord's conclusion. It is something
the common law courts simply do not know.4
But the fact remains that instances of martial law have become of frequent recurrence in the United States. Within little
over a year, martial law has been in force, for widely varying
reasons, in Oklahoma City, in Herrin, in Lorain, and in the
tornado-stricken cities of southern Illinois. -It was mentioned
as a possibility in Weehawken, N. J., a few months ago during
the disorders attending liquor smuggling. As a result, it has
become a matter of importance to determine the legal basis for
the existence of martial law and its legal effect upon the rights
of private citizens, and upon the relationship between the soldier
and the civilian. It is the purpose of this article to discover how
far these things may be ascertained from the decisions.
'See cases discussed p.
infra.
'Martial Law, i54 Law Times 38i (Igzz).

6Id., 38Z
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At the beginning of the present century, it was, as has been
said, a debatable question whether martial law could rightfully
exist in English-speaking countries other than in the actual zone
of conflict in war time.5 Inv6lving as it does a dictatorship,
carrying with it the strength of the army together with an
immunity for the dictator and his agents from responsibility for
extraordinary invasions of citizens' rights, martial law is ap-.
parently discordant with the theory of democracy. In its present
form it first appeared in England in the days of Tudor
absolutism. It is descended from the ancient jurisdiction of the
Court of the Constable and Marshall, which is defined by the
statute of 14 Richard 116 as extending in wartime over all matters touching war within the realm. This statute gave that iourt
jurisdiction only over soldiers and those liable to be called as
soldiers in time of war. By reason of the attainder of the
holder of the office of constable in the reign of Henry VIII the
office was forfeited to the Crown. 7 " The Crown never again
appointed anyone to this office but reserved its functions for
itself. Characteristically, the Tudors did not feel themselves
bound by the limitations of the jurisdiction, either that respecting the time of war or that restricting it to soldiers.
The use of this martial law power increased through the sixteenth century with the increase of absolutism in the sovereigns.
Under Elizabeth on more than one occasion a subject guilty of
a single infraction of the law was declared to be in rebellion
against the Crown and was subsequently arrested and tried by
the rules of martial law. These abuses became more and more
pronounced under the first Stuarts until the people's patience
was exhausted. In 1629 Parliament forced the King to sign
'Roberts.

Some Observations upon the Case of Private Wadsworth, St

Am. L, Reg. 63. y6s (i9o3) ; Dicey, Law of the Constitution. (8th ed.,

'915)

and note. p. 538 at p. 544. And see Holdsworth. Martial Law Historically
Considered. 18 LAW QUARTERLY REviEw 117 (1902): Ballentine. Martial Law.
23.

12 COL. L. REV. 529 (i=iz); Ballentine. Unconstitutional Claims of Military

Authority. 5 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 718 (1914).
13 Rich. II. St. T. c. 2 (1389).
1
' See as to this. and as to the history of martial law in England. generally,
Holdsworth. Martial Law Historically Considered, 18 LAw QUARTERLY REVIEW 117 (1902).
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the Petition of Right,8 which practically prohibits martial law
jurisdiction over civilians at any time, or even over soldiers
except in time of war. From that time until very recent years
there were practically no cases involving an attempt to impose
martial law upon the people of England itself, and apparently
the legal commentators considered martial law as applied to
civilians impossible in England.
This has not been true, however, with regard to the English colonies. In America the ,institution of martial law in
Massachusetts was one of the sparks which fired the Revolution.9 This abuse, coming as it did just prior to the Revolution,
caused each of the states to make part of its fundamental law
'3

Car. 1. (1627).

The pertinent portions of the petition are: "And

whereas also by the authority of Parliament in the twenty-fifth year of the
reign of King Edward the Third, it is declared and enacted, that no man
shall be forejudged of life and limb against the form of the great charter,
and the law of the land; and by the said great charter and other laws and
statutes of this your realm, no man ought to be adjudged to death. but by
the laws established in this your realm, either by the customs of the same
realm or by acts of Parliament: and whereas no offender of what kind soever
is exempted from the proceedings to be used and the punishments to be inflicted by the laws and statutes of your realm; nevertheless, of late divers
commissions under your majesty's great seal have issued forth, by which
certain high persons have been assigned and appointed commissioners with
power and authority to proceed within the land, according to the justice of
martial law against such soldiers and mariners, or other dissolute persons
joining with them as should commit any murder, robbery, felony, mutiny, or
other outrage or misdemeanor whatsoever, and by such summary course or
order, as is agreeable to martial law. and is used in armies in time of war,
to proceed to the trial and condemnation of such offenders, and them to-cause
to be executed and put to death, according to the law martial.
"By pretext whereof, some of your majesty's subjects have been by some
of the said commissioners put to death,' when and where, if by the laws and
statutes of the realm they had deserved death, by the same laws and statutes
also they might, and by none other ought to have been, adjudged and executed.
"And also sundry grievous offenders by color thereof, have escaped punishments due to them by the laws and statutes of this your realm . . . upon
pretense that the said offenders were punishable only by martial law. and by
authority of such commissions as aforesaid, which commissions, and all others
of like nature, are wholly and directly contrary to'the said laws and statutes
of this your realm.
"They therefore do humbly pray your most excellent majesty, . . . that
the aforesaid commissions for proceeding by martial law may be revoked and
annulled; and that hereafter no commissions of like nature may issue forth
to any person or persons whatsoever, to be executed as aforesaid, lest by color
of them any of your majesty's subjects be destroyed or put to death, contrary to the laws and franchise of the land." 'Bancroft, Ifistory of the United States, Vol. VII, S6 et seq.
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the provision that in all cases the military power should be
subordinate to the civil.10 In the early years of our history as a
nation, martial law was never resorted to. Washington, in sending troops to put down the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania,
gave very explicit orders that the soldiers should hold themselves
subordinate to the civil authoritiei, and the soldiers in no instance went beyond what would be justified under the ordinary
police power." Jefferson's attempt to make use of it by procuring the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the
trouble with Burr met with a prompt and decisive rebuff from2
Congress, which--refused to suspend the writ at his request.'
General Jackson, it is true, put the city of New Orleans under
martial
law and suspended the writ temporarily. But in characteristic fashion, after the necessity had passed, he admitted that
he had been in error and submitted to the fine which the court
imposed upon him.' 3 Martial law was used for the first time in
our history with the subsequent acquiescence of the courts in
Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island in 184o. In order to put down
a formidable rebellion the government of the state called out its
militia which, without any gross invasion of ordinary private
rights, quelled the riots occuring throughout Rhode Island. Civil
government was restored immediately upon their suppression. 4
In the Civil War an attempt to establish martial law outside the
zone of actual conflict was condemned by the majority of the
Supreme Court in Er parte Milligan."
The exigencies of our changing civilization in the period
following the Civil War have, however, settled the question. It
"This provision in so many words is found in the constitutions of all the
states except New York. For a complete digest of the constitutional provisions upon this subject, see Stimson, Federal and State Constitutions, 82, 245248. The Constitutions of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and
South Carolina. give express sanction to martial law in case of necessity,
although in three of these states it is to be declared by authority of the
Legislature. Id., 246.
See dissenting opinion of Robinson. J., in State v. Brown, 71 W. Va.
519, 544. 77 S. 1. 243 (912).
See dissenting opinion of Steele, I, in In re Moyer, 35 Colo. i59, iSo,

8r Pam 19o (i9oS).
2Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law (2d ed.) 426, note.
"Luther v. Borden, 7 How. I (U. S. 1849).

a"4 Wall.

2

(U. S. i867).

MARTIAL LAW AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE CIVILIAN

385

is now beyond serious dispute that martial law in some form
may exist under certain circumstances even in times of peace.
or, in times of war, outside the zone of actual conflict. Since
1902 martial law has been enforced with the subsequent acquiescence of the courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, in six of the states during times when the nation was
at peace. 6 On two other occasions the courts, vvhile holding
that martial law was not in existencd under the facts in the particular case, have conceded that it might exist under some cir7
cumstances in their respective states.
In the British courts the twentieth century has seen a similar
development of the law on this subject. In 1902 the question
arose as to whether a military commission might judge and
punish a person in British territory in South Africa during the
Boer War for an act done two hundred miles from the battlefront'. 8 Disturbances were at the time rampant throughout the
entire colony, and the Privy Council held that martial law existed, and refused to disturb the execution of the commission's7
sentence. The Parliament of Great Britain, during the recent
war, passed statutes authorizing the executive even in the home
territory of Great Britain to exercise powers or to give powers
to military authorities in cases of necessity, far beyond the
common law police power over civilians.19 In England, of
course, this statute cannot be questioned, but it seems clear that
it was considered by the House of Lords to make no change in
20
the Constitution.
' Colorado: In re- Moyer. 35 Colo. 159, 85 Pac. 190 (19o4) ; Moyer v. Peabody 212 U. S. 78 (io9) ; Idaho: In re Boyle. (x899) 6 Idaho 6o9, 57 Pac.
706 (1899); Montana: Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947 (14) ;
Nebraska: U. S. v. Fischer, 28o Fed. 208 (IY. C. Neb. 1922); Pennsylvania;
Commonwealth v. Shortall, 2o6 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903); Texas: U. S. v.
Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (D. C. Texas 1926).
IfEx parte I-avinder, 88 W. Va. 713; 1os S. E. 428 (1921); Bishop v.
Vandercook, 228 Mich. 349, 2oo N. W. 278 (1924).
13
Ex Parte Marais [1902] A. C. io9.
"Defence of the Realm Act, 5 Geo. V., Chap. 8 (1914).
*Rex v. Halliday. [1917] A. C. 26o. in which the House of Lords upheld.
under Regulation 14 B made by his Majesty's Council under the Defence of
the Realm Act, supra, the internment of a naturalized citizen of hostile origin
on the ground that "it was expedient."
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Against all this there stands only one state supreme court
which has actually denied that martial law can exist when the
nation is at peace, and has held -that in such time the military
may act only in strict subordination to the civil authorities, and
may not exercise any powers in excess of the ordinary police
21

powers.

While it is not our purpose to seek the reasons for this development, it seems that at bottom it is due to the rising tide
of group consciousness that has developed with startling rapidity since the middle of the nineteenth century, overwhelming the
ideal of individual liberty, which was so powerful in the Englishspeaking countries in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The broadest expression of this group feeling is the
Nationalist sentiment, leading as it did in the World War to the
organization of the entire nation, instead of merely its professional armies, for war. In this state of affairs, the placing of
even parts of the territory of the United States, four thousand
miles from the embattled area, under a species of martial law,
seemed in no degree unnatural. 22 Scarcely less significant an
exhibition of this group feeling is seen in the organization of
laboring men into unions to further the interests of their group.
The unions have at times become so powerful as to control particular districts. Under the influence of irresponsible leaders,
they have more than once been diverted from their ordinary and
legitimate sphere of activity, and have undertaken to overthrow
the constituted authorities and to enforce their demands by
physical terrorism. In several instances, since i9o2, they have
paralyzed the civil agencies of law enforcement, and the people,
to avert a greater evil, have acquiesced in the declaration of
martial law in the affected districts. In fact, they have generally
applauded the action of the executive who took such strong
measures. The courts, feeling the same constraint, have fol"'lowed the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the peov. Smith, 142 Ky. 232. 134 S. NV. 484 (igzI).
" This was done, not under any new war-time legislation, but under a
statute which has been standing upon the books in its entirety since the Civil
WNar, and in greatest part since i8o6. U. S. Rev. St., Sec 1343.
'* Franks
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pie, and have declared such instances of martial law, and acts
2a
done thereunder, to be political matters beyond their cognizance.

II.
There remain a number of questions which cannot, as yet,
be said to be settled. First, under what conditions will the courts
hold that a state of martial law exists or has existed so as to
withdraw acts done under it from their cognizance? Second,
conceding that martial law exists, so as to withdraw the great
majority of acts done thereideit from the cognizance of the
civil courts, does the fact of martial law withdraw all acts done
thereunder from the cognizance of the civil courts, or are
there some acts so extreme that even the protecting mantle
of martial law will not shield the soldier from subsequent
accountability to the injured parties in the courts? There
is a third question of grave importance which comes up
in this connection. How far is a soldier protected in case
of an injury inflicted by him under an order given by his
puperior acting under the supposed authority of martial law,
if the courts later decide that the superior from whom the
order emanated was not legally authorized to give it?
The first of these questions is discussed in the recent case
f the Worhd
of Bishop v. Vandercook.24 During the nerio
War, while state'prohibition was in force in Michigan, there
was persistent illicit transportation of liquor from Ohio to
Michigan. These activities, and the-efforts of the authorities to
curb them, led to a constant racing of automobiles on the main
highway between Toledo and Detroit, seriously interfering with
traffic and endangering life. The sheriff of Monroe County,
Michigan, experienced difficulty in stopping these practices and
asked aid from the Governor. The Governor issued an order
directing the defendant, Colonel Vandercook, to take a detachment of the militia, proceed to Monroe County for duty, and
'C. v. Shortall, supra, note 16; In re Moyer, supra, note 16, Moyer v4
Peabody, supra. note x6; Ex parte McDonald, supra, note 16; State v. Brown,
supra, note 11.
"228 Mich. 349, 200 N. W. 278 (Iga4).
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take such steps as might be necessary to "protect the highways
from lawless and viciously inclined drivers of automobiles," to
enforce the laws, an.to give the sheriff such assistance "as he
requires in putting a stop to conditions which not only menace
the people of Michigan, but the truck transportation of the United
States army." Difficulty in enforcing these orders was. subsequently brought to the attention of the Governor by the defendant, Vandercook. The Governor thereupon authorized the
placing of a log across the roadway, but directed that "every
. .
be taken to give the good citizens a chance
precaution
to get through and to see that people were not inconvenienced
and to take such steps as would give everybody a warning as to
the use of the log." Acting under these orders, the soldliers
under. Colonel Vandercook, apparently under the more immediate command of the other defendant, Captain Childs, placed
the log across the road. The plaintiff, a taxicab driver in Toledo, was hired to take a party to Detroit. The passengers were
carrying intoxicating liquor but it was not shown that the plaintiff knew this fact. According to the plaintiff's testimony, when
the cab was at a considerable distance from the log, two men
jumped out from the side of the road and began to shoot. He,
thinking they were "stick-up men" did not stop, but rather
increased his speed. He saw no later signals or warnings until
he crashed into the log. His machine was overturned and he
was seriously injured. A verdict and judgment for the plaintiff
was affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal. The Court held
that martial law was not in force in the district at the time;
that, as a result the military officers had no authority beyond
the ordinary police powers, and were liable for all violence used
beyond what was justified by such police powers and, therefore
were liable for the injury to the plaintiff.
Even though the courts have no cognizance of acts done
under cover of martial law, yet when an appropriate case is
brought before them, they must say whether or not martial law
was in force at the time of the invasions complained of. The
.ordinary statement of the rule is in the form of a' two-fold
proposition. When a state of insurrection exists, the Governor
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or the legislature, if it is in session, may declare martial law:
the question as to when a state of insurrection exists is a political one as to which the Governor or the legislature, is the
final judge. Whether the Michigan case accepts this rule is
somewhat doubtful from the opinion. When the opinion is considered in the light of the facts, it may mean either (i) that
martial law does not exist until the Governor actually proclaims
it .(or proclaims that the district is in a state of insurrection),
and that merely authorizing acts justifiable only under a state
of martial law is not equivalent'to such proclamation; or (2)
that there are certain limits,. other than mere good faith, to the
Governor's right to declare martial law.
The first of these alternatives does not seem to be
-correct. Formal executive proclamation was not considered
necessary to the existence of a state of martial law in many
recent instances. In Commonwealth v. Shortall,25 there was
no declaration of martial law ipsis verbis, but there was what the
Court called a declaration of qualified martial law. It was in
substance an order to the Commander-in-Chief to place his entire division on duty, to protect all persons in life, limb and
property from intimidation or violence, and to preserve the
public peace and good order. So in the recent Irish cases involving habeas corpus proceedings, the Court, in declining to
take jurisdiction upon the ground that martial law was in force,
referred to no declaration of martial law, and apparently considered such declaration unnecessary.2 6 A substantially similar decision was rendered in England during the war.2 7

It

seems, therefore, that a formal declaration of martial law by
the executive is not requisite to afford protection to those using

such extraordinary measures to preserve the peace, in an emerMSupra, note i6.
"There was, however, an act of the D1il Eireann empowering the Minister of Defense to take the necessary steps for the national defense, and the
DItil later ratified the acts of the Army and Military Commissions. See
Rex v. Alien, [1921] 2 I. R. 241; Rek v. Strickand, [ig92] 2 1. R. 317, 333;
Rex v. O'Sullivan, [xgM3] 2 I. R. 13; Rex v. Adjutant-General, [x923] i 1.
R.S.
W"Cf. Rex v. Halliday, supra, note 2o.

390

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REP IEW

gency.

Conversely, in Ex parte Lavinder28 it was held that a

mere declaration of martial law, or of a state of war,2 9 by the
Governor, without more, does not of itself, establish a state of
martial law.
It appears, then, that the other alternative is the correct
one, and that there are limits to the Governor's discretion in declaring and enforcing martial law. It would be startling if one
of our Governors could, like the Tudors or Stuarts, declare
martial law in a district where there is profound peace, while
the nation is not at war, and send down troops, close the courts,
and suspend the writ of Iabeas carpus in the district. Yet it
would be a long step in this direction if the courts, following.to
the limit, indeed going beyond the self-declared limit of the de-.
cision in Luther v. Borden,"0 should hold this a political matSupra, note

17.

It is taken for grainted by the West Virginia Court in the cases of Ex
parle Lavinder, supra, note x7, and State v. Brown and Ex pane Jones, infra,
note 35, that a state may carry on a war independently of the nation.
In an article on The Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals, 12 CAt.u'. L REv.
75, 559 (1924), Major L K. Underhill denies the right of a state to engage
in war to suppress insurrection or for any other purpose except to defend
itself from imminent invasion, pp. i68-s7o. The words of the Federal Constitution support him. Article 1,Section io, provides that "no state shall,
without the consent of Congress, . . . engage inwar, unless actually invaded
or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." From the context
and sources of this passage, it seems clear that the "imminent danger" referred to is "imminent danger of invasion." i2 CAmiF. L Rv., 168.. But
it seems that the West Virgiia Court is merely recognizing a fact which is
thrust upon the state by necessity or by the will of its people, notwithstanding constitutional limitations. Cf. Grier, I.,in The Prize Cases, 67 U. S.
(2 Black) 635, 667 (1862): "When the regular course of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion or insurrection, so that the Courts of Justice cannot be kept open, civil war exists and hostilities may be prosecuted on the
same footing as if those opposing the Government were foreign enemies invading the land." Though it have not the right, a state has on occasion, the
Court concedes, the actual power to declare war.
=7 Howard x (U. S. 1849). In this case, the trespass complained of
was committed by soldiers, who broke the plaintiff's close in seeking to
arrest him, at a time when they suspected that he was concealed on the
premises. As the plaintiff was suspected, with good reason, of being in arms
against the government, the actions of the military were justified under the
ordinary police power. The defendants nieded to justify under martial law
only to the extent that it invested them with the authority of ordinary police
officers. The Court indeed said that in a state of war, the troops might be
called upon by the state to suppress an insurrection, and that the state was the
final judge as to when this drastic measure should be required. But this
was followed by these words: "In relation to the act of the Legislature, declaring martial law, it is not necessary, in the case before us, to inquire to
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ter, of which they have no cognizance. Certainly, there should be
some requirements, other than mere good faith, which must be
complied with before an executive can declare martial law. 'Indeed, in all the American cases in which it has been said that the
action of the executive authority is not reviewable in such matters, there has been a condition of violent public disorder, amounting to continuous rioting or complete overthrow of civil *authority
in the district, or a state of actual insurrection or war. In a state
of actual public peace, there is no necessity for this extraordinary power. Its exercise is a clear violation of the Petition
of Right.3 1 This provision of the Petition has, in substance,
been adopted in the Federal, and in all the state constitutions.a'
A few recent cases furnish positive evidence of the likelihood that the courts will recognize limits to the discretion of the
38
political departments in this matter. In a recent Irish case,
the Court took judicial notice of the fact that the rebellion in
Ireland: had been suppressed so far as to say that a state of war
no longer existed, and held that, as a result, further executive
orders in suppression of the revolt were reviewable by the courts,
and that such of these orders as were beyond the ordinary police
powers in times of peace were illegal. The Court, therefore,
freed the petitioner who had been arrested and confined under
such orders.
The case of Ex parte Lavinder 374 involved a situation where
the Governor, because of serious rioting in Mingo County, pro-'
claimed martial law and sent a military officer to .the county to
take charge of the situation. No other soldiers were sent to the
what extent, or under what circumstances that power may be exercised by a
state. Unquestionably, a military government, established as the permanent
government of the state, would not be a republican form of government,and it would be the duty of Congress to overthrow it. But the law of Rhode
Island evidently contemplated no such government." Note, too, that in this
case the Court was not dealing with the rikht of the executive to declare martial law without consulting the Legislature.
" Supra, note 8. In the case of Ex parle Marias, supra,note 17, the House
of Lords declared that the petition applied only in times of peace.
nSupra, note 3o.
"Rex v. The Military Governor of tht Military Internment Camp, [924]
i L R. 3a.
"Supra, not; 17.

-3'
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district and the military officer was simply placed in charge of
the civil authorities. The petitioners were arrested and confined
in jail without trial, and no effort was being made to bring
them to trial. The CourtI issued a writ of habeas corpus, declaring that martial law did not exist, and that the imprisonment
of the petitioners was, therefore, unjustifiable. This Court had
in earlier cases -3 refused to review the decision of the Governor
as to the necessity for declaring martial law at a time when there
was an insurrection in progress. But in this case it was held
that the Governor had no such discretion when no state of war
or armc~d insurrection existed, and no soldiers were in the field.
The decision seems to rest upon the method in which the Governor attempted to exercise this extraordinary power. The
Court. said that he could not, simply because of his military
power as Commander-in-Chief of the militia, confer upon civil
peace officers the right to use these war powers, but that he could
exercise such powers only through the militia. But the Court
goes on to say that, if this were not so the Governor might, at
any time, through the medium of civil officers, exercise these
arbitrary powers, even though there were no necessity. This, theCourt .says, is beyond the Governor s power, as he cannot putmartial law into force except in time of invasion or insurrection.
That the Michigan case 36 is explainable on a similar ground
seems very probable. The trespass occurred after the war had
in fact come to an end, although no formal declaration to that
effect had yet been made. There was not a condition of domestic
insurrection or riot, such as would paralyze the civil authorities.
Under such circumstances, the Court held, acts beyond what
were embraced by the ordinary police powers were not justified,
even though done at the command of the Governor under what
the defendants termed, and the Governor intended to be, from
the tenor of his orders, martial law.
It seems likely, therefore, that in the future the Courts may
impose some limit beyond mere good faith upon the executive's
* State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 51, 77 S.
71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1o29 (zgi3).
" Bishop v. Vandercook, supra, note 7.

. 243 (19t2); Ek parte Jones,
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discretion in declaring and enforcing martial law. The broad
rule, enunciated in the cases, that the governor, if he acts in good
faith, is the final judge as to the existence of the necessity for
these extraordinary measures, 7 will probably be modified to
some extent. The courts seem inclined to hold that mere persistent breach of one law, or an isolated crime, even amouting
to treason, is not justification to the Governor for declaring martial law in times of substantial peace in the vicinity. Either a
state of war must exist or civil authority in the district
must be so far paralyzed that the enforcement of all, not merely
one, of the laws is suspended or in danger of complete collapse.
Whether such facts exist may ordinarily be for the executive
to determine, but when he does not even claim the existence of
such facts, or when they.obviously do not exist, it seems probable that the courts generally, in the future, will hold, as the Irish
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Courts of West Virginia
and Michigan have held, that in spite of the executive's action,
martial law does not exist.
It may well be that the courts will strike a middle ground
such as the West Virginia Supreme Court suggested in the cases
of State v. Browu 38 and Ex parte Jones.391 There the Court
suggested that if the Governor had acted unreasonably in deClaring martial law, he might be held answerable subsequently,after the disorder hadbeen put down, for invasions of citizens'
rights in pursuance of such declaration. But the Court did not
consider that it had the right to interfere with the executive while
he was at work in putting down the supposed rebellion. In the
North Carolina case of Ex parte Moore,40 the Court came, in
effect, to the same conclusion. While saying that it had the right
"In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 460, x43 Pac. 947, 949 (1914); In fe
Moyer, 35 Colo. 559, z64, 85 Pac. igo, 192 (59o4); State v. Brown, 71 W. Va.
519, 524, 77 S.E. 243,246 (1912). The original American authority upon which
these decisions purport to rest is Martin v. Mott, z2 Wheat ig,(U. S. x827)
in which the United States Supreme Court, through Story, I., upheld the
right of the President to declare when such an emergency existed as to justify
the calling out of the militia.
" Supra, note xi.
"Supra, note 35.
'64 N. C. &2 087o).
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to interfere with the Governor's actions, it denied that it had
the power to do so. The Court's process against the Governor
could be served only by the sheriff's gathering an opposing
army to combat that commanded: by the Governor. Realizing
that the only method of enforcing his decree was by inaugurating what amounted to a rebellion against the government under
which he held office, Pierson, C. J., refused to order the sheriff
to forcibly execute the decree, saying that he had no power to
enforce it under the circumstances. There is much to be said
for this position. The courts may make themselves ridiculous
by issuing decrees which they cannot enforce. On the other
hand, they may occasionally paralyze the only efficient arm of
the Government in combating serious emergencies. Butthese
objections would not apply to a subsequent holding, in an action
brought after the subsidence of the disturbance, that the officials who ordered such invasions of private rights, or the
soldiers acting under them, are liable in trespass to those whose
rights they, have invaded.
III.
During the time when martial law exists, the military commander is, according to the majority view, in absolute control.
His actions are not subject to judicial review in any civil court 4 1
There have been no American cases which repudiate this doctrine. But there have been no Americar cases involving any
outrageous abuse of power by the military commander.
In England, there is one case on the books in which the
military commander under martiai law powers, went beyond the
'See cases cited in note 16, supra. But note that in In re McDonald,
supra, note 16, it was held that the governor could not authorize a trial by
military commission even though he might authorize the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus temporarily and other drastic measures to restore
.order. But it seems that to effectively put down a rebellion or serious insurrection, the military sfiould have power to impose reasonable punishment
upon those who do not obey-regulations. Such punishments Would naturally
often include imprisonment even after the end of military rule. This distinction between so-called "preventive" martial-law which the Montana Court
permits under certain circumstances, and "punitive" martial law which it
condemns under all circumstances, seems not well founded. See Glenn, The
Army and the Law, (x9i8) i85-i8q. But see for a defense of the Court's
position in In re McDonald. Underhill, Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals in
the United States over Civilians, iaCALis. L. Rv. i59, 165 et seq. (r924).
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necessities of the situation. In the case of Wright v. Fitzgerald,4 2 an action of trespass was brought against Fitzgerald,
the high-sheriff of Tipperary, who was in control of the forces
engaged in putting down a rebellion in that county. The plaintiff, without trial, was condemned by the defendant to receive
five hundred lashes and then to be shot. According to the evidence the defendant thereafter kicked the plaintiff and struck
him with his sword, causing blood to flow, and caused one hundred and fifty lashes to be inflicted upon the plaintiff's back.
The final part of the sentence was, for some reason not stated,
never executed. The defendant took the stand and claimed that
a necessity for such treatment existed, and went on to portray
graphically the success he enjoyed in obtaining confessions of
guilt from those suspected of treason by flogging, and to state
that he considered himself justified in cutting off the heads of
these suspects, if necessary to obtain confessions. This bit of
reasoning was so abstruse as to "somewhat discdmpose the gravity of the Court," in the words of the reporter. The plaintiff
obtained the verdict, on the ground that the defendant's violence had exceeded the necessities of the case.
So far as is known. this case stands alone. In no other
case where martial law admittedly existed has the court ventured to criticize or review the action of the military commander. While martial law exists the. jurisdiction of the civil
courts is suspended. As the Michigan court says in Bishop 7?.
Prandercook.43 martial law is no law at all. The arbitrary will
of the commander is the supreme authority. To use the Continental phrase, "the Constitutional guarantees are suspended.'
Our courts never use this phrase, yet it expresses what occurs
during martial law in England and America. Certain of our
constitutional guarantees are suspended because either the necessities of wail demand it, or because the constitutionally appointed
authorities are paralyzed and cannot enforce those guarantees.
The permanent safety of our constitutional form of government
and our constitutional rights and'liberties requires a temporary
27 State Trials 759 (1790).

Supra, note 17.
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suspension of certain of those guarantees in order to restore
permanent effectiveness to the machinery set up for the preservation of those constitutional rights and liberties.
The opposite viewpoint is set forth with great eloquence in
the opinion of Judge Davis, speaking for the majority of the
United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan,4" coming to
a climax in the famous declaration that "a country, preserved at
the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth
the cost of preservation." 45 But whatever may be said for the
opinion expressed in Judge Davis' dictum, it is now fairly well
settled by the decisions that under certain circumstances these
constitutional rights and liberties of citizens must be temporarily foregone. So Justice Holmes, in delivering the majority
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Moyer v. Peabody,46 forty-two years after Ex parte Milligan, says: "W~hcn it
comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what
he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants
4
the substitution of executive process for judicicial process."1 7
And the fact remains that, with the exception of a single nisi
prius case in Ireland, 4" no decision has undertaken to limit the
power of the military commander in times of martial law, other
than by the requirement of good faith.
The requirement of good faith, mentioned in some dicta,
notably in Moyer ,. Peabody,4 is after all but a shadowy limitation, non-compliance with which is almost incapable of proof.
The official can in many cases claim with a good show of justice,
even with the approval of his own conscience, that in the heat
of the disturbance he considered the extraordinary force used
necessary. This would justify him, in view of Justice Holmes.
But while practically no restrictions have been imposed upon
military commanders by the courts, except in the Fitzgerald case,
Wall. 2 (U. S. z866).
Id., x26
212 U. S. 78 (19o9).
Id., 8-.

"4

W
Vright v. Fitzgerald, supra, note 42.
'Supra, note 46, at p. 85.
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yet no cases but this have come before them, where extraordinary violence has been used. Most of the cases have involved
a temporary suspension of the writ of habear corpits, with an
imprisonment of sixty days or less. In one case a man was
shot down and killed on suspicion that he might be about to
attempt a felony.50 Neither of these things would be justifiable
under the police power. But to hold that such actions are justifiable during martial law is far from holding that nothing done
by the military during a period of martial law is reviewable
by the courts. Justice Holmes intimates that Moyer v. Peabody might have gone differently if the imprisonment had
stretched over a number of years.- 1 The English trial court in
the Fitzgerald case departed from the broad rule when it was
faced with a case of extreme cruelty. And it is not easy to imagine that any court would adhere to the rule if, in a time when a
band of turbulent strikers had gained control of the community,an overzealous military commander should turn his soldiers
loose to overawe the strikers and the community generally by
rapine and pillage. Rape and wanton murder were practiced
by some of the armies in Europe during the recent war at the
instance of their officers, as report has it, and the courts, being
powerless, attempted to exercise no control over the soldiers.
But can it be conceived that such things would go unchallenged
by the courts when the nation generally was at peace? The
question has never been tested in our courts but the answer
appears obvious. If we are ever s.o unfortunate -as"to have a
temporary reversion to barbarous depotism of this sort, there
seems to be little doubt that our courts will punish the offenders,
and that the plea of martial law will not avail as a protection.
One rather vague dictum and one nisi prfius case are enough
to confirm us in this conclusion, in view of the abhorrence of
this sort of military tyranny felt by the men who compose our
courts and by our people in general. The counter-dicta that the
acts of the military commander in times of martial law are not
reviewable are far too broad.
"Commonwealth v. Shortall, supra, note ix
'Supra, note 46, at p. 85.
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IV..
One of the most curious phenomena in our law is the
status of the soldier who, in .obeying an order of his superior,
threatens or inflicts death or serious injury upon a civilian, or
deprives him of his liberty, only to find himself arrested and
brought to trial because the orders under which he acted were
not authorized. This usually is brought into question only in
times of martial law or supposed martial law. If the officer
goes beyond his authority, whether deliberately or by mistake,
in issuing the order, is the soldier justified in executing it, "by
reason of his duty to obey? If the officer has issued an order
in pursuance of his authority under martial law, only to find,
as in the recent West Virginia and Michigan cases,5 2 that
martial law did not exist, is he justified by reason of the order
of his superior officer, the Governor? The cases on the subject
are not numerous, but they have generally held that the soldier
is not justified by his orders.5 If the officer is mistaken in the
existence of martial law,"4 if the executive goes beyond his authority in his order to the military,55 if the military authorities
are acting under the civil in putting down disorder, and the
soldier is given an order beyond what the police power would
justify, 5 -in all these cases the soldier is liable, by the weight
of authority, for the injury inflicted by him upon private citizens. Truly, as Dicey says,57 his lot is a hard one-he is "liable
to be shot by a court-martial if he disobeys an order, and to be
hanged by a judge and jury if he obeys it."
Some courts have announced exceptions to this strict rule.
There are dicta in cases involving crimes to the effect that the
soldier is excused for his otherwise criminal act unless his orders were illegal on their face,5 8 or "palpably illegal" on their
'Ex porte Lavender, supra. note

17; Bishop v. Vandercook, supra, note 17.

Mostvn v. Fabrias. i Cowp. i6f, 9 E. R. o2r (774) ; Little v. Barreme. 2 Cranch. i7o (U. S. i8o4): Mitchell v. Harmony,.'13 How. xiS (U. S.
x85x): Franks v. Smith, supra, note 2r; Bishop v. Vandercook, supra, note 11.
Franks- v- Smith, supra. note 21.

"Little v. Barreme, supra, note 53; Franks v- Smith, supra, note 2!.
lBishop v. Vandercook, supra, note 17.
Dicey, Law of the Constitution, (8th ed., x9i5) 2996
'Riggs v. State, 3 Cold. 85 (Tenn. 1866).
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face.59 This rule seems just as regards criminal liability. It
would, indeed, be harsh treatment to punish the soldier for doing
what reasonably appears to him to be his duty, especially when,
as in time of war or rebellion, he has behind him the threat of
most severe penalties at the hands of the military authorities if
he disobeys.
But even in criminal cases, the courts have been slow to
excuse the soldier under such circumstances. 0 It is, then, only
natural to find them loath to relieve the soldier from civil liability to the citiien injured by the unwarranted invasion of his
rights. In a few early cases, however, the soldier was held excused from civil liability when he acted under orders.
In Despan v. Olney,6" a case arising out of Dorr's Rebel.
lion in Rhode Island, the court charged that a soldier who arrests a citizen is justified even though his act would not be justifiable under the ordinary police power, if (i) there is no malice
and he follows his orders exactly with intent to do his military
duty; and (2) the orders are such as, from their nature, are
within the scope of the officer's authority and nothing appears
to show that the authority is not lawfully exercised in the particular case.
A similar limitation was placed upon the strict rule of liability in McCall v. McDowell.6 2 One defendant, Douglas, a soldier under the orders of the other defendant, McDowell, his
commanding general, arrested the plaintiff for speaking words
derogatory of Lincoln, shortly after the latter's assassination.
This was not. a crime and the arrest was, therefore, unjustified.
But while the commander was held in the action, the soldier was
relieved from liability, since he made the arrest under an order
of his superior officer which was not palpably illegal. 38 Yet even
here, the Court might not have reached this decision but for the
*In re Fair, oo Fed. 149 (900).
"See U. S. v. Carr, i Woods 48o (U. S. C. C. 1872); Commonwealth
v. Blodgett, 53 Mass. s6 (1846).
a 1 Curtis 3o6 (U. S. C C. x85z).
a I Abb. 212 (U. S. C. C 1867).
'Id., 21A
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Indemnity Act of Congress, 4 which ratified all acts done by
soldiers, until orders, whether legal or illegal when given, during the Civil War period. This act, without more, furnished the
5
subordinate with a complete defense.1
Only one case has held, without qualification, that the
soldier's acts are justified when done under orders0 6 But the
broad rule laid down in this case did not seem necessary to its
decision. The Court enunciated it in holding the lower courit
in error in sustaining a demurrer to a plea that the trespass
alleged was committed by the defendants, under orders of their
superior officer, in commandeering the plaintiff's property for
the use of the army in the field. The facts recited in the. plea
would justify the superior in giving the orders, if he acted in
good faith. So the soldiers would be justified in any case.
On the other hand, in the only recent cases in which the
question has come up, 7 the strict doctri*ne has been re-affirmed
and the soldier has been held liable for the trespass when the
orders under which he acted were ih fact illegal, irrespective of
whether they might appear so to him. There is, therefore, but
little basis for the view prevalent among some of the theorizers
on the subject that the soldier, acting under orders, is justified
even if the order is beyond the authority of commander to issue.
AT.
The decisions since r9o2 must considerably modify the
view generally held up to that time as to the possibility, extent
and effect of martial law, as distinguished from military law, in
the English-speaking countries. The law at present, it is submitted, may be concisely stated as follows:
r. Martial law may exist in the United States in cases of
necessity.
"Act of March -A 186.3, Section A. This waq considered and held
constitutional -by the Circuit Court in M'Call v. M'Dowell. suPra. note 62.
A motion for a new trial was iefuse~d by the Circuit Court of Appeals on
which Field, I.,of the Siipreme Court, was sitting.
-Supra, note 62 at p. 239.
"Tramwell v. Bassett. 24 Ark. 499 OW-66). See dictum-to the same
effect in Taylor v. Jenkins, 24 Ark. 337 (866).
I Franks v. Smith, supra, note 21; Bishop v. Vandercool, supra, note 17.
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This necessity is, in general; a p6litical matter, to be
decided by the executive or the legislature.
3. But the mere breach, or persistent breach, of a single
law does not create the necessity. The defiance of law in the
district must be general, and of such nature as to close the
courts or paralyie the administration of the law. Until at least
a semblance of these conditions exists, the Governor has no discretion to declare martial law.
4. The authority of the military commander under martial
law is very broad and will shield him in all suits brought by
private citizens unless:
(a) he has acted without good faith or with malice; or
(b) he has so flagrantly invaded rights of individuals as to
shock all sense of decency,-has, for example, inflicted or permitted flogging, torture, rape, or pillage.
5.The individual officer or soldier is not protected; in the
absence of statute, from civil liability merely because he acted
under orders, if, in fact, his superior, for any reason, had no
right to give such orders, although Congress may constitutionally
indemnify him against, or relieve him from, liability for such
acts done in wartime.
Gerald F. Flood.
PhiladelphdaPa.
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